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It was not until 1948, when the Cominform conflict escalated, that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia began a thorough 
implementation of the Soviet model in Yugoslav agriculture – due to the Soviet criticism, the CPY made immediate legislative 
changes and started a class struggle in Yugoslav villages. Simultaneously, and just a few months before the Fifth Congress, 
Josip Broz Tito initiated a competition for building 4,000 Farming Cooperative Centres throughout Yugoslavia - they were built 
in accordance with the social-realist “national in form – socialist in content” slogan. Once the building started, in his 
Congress speech, Radovan Zogović, a leader of the Serbian Agitprop department, offered the first official proclamation of 
Socialist Realism in the post-war period by a political authority. This article analyses the process of planning, designing and 
building of the Farming Cooperative Centres; discusses their political, ideological and formal implications; and inquires into 
the specific role of architecture, joined with the theory of Socialist Realism, in building Yugoslav socialism. 
Key words: the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute; the Five-year plan; Farming Cooperative Centres; Socialist Realism; national in form. 
 
THE POLITICS: THE SOVIET-
YUGOSLAV DISPUTE 1  
In March 1947, after an unsuccessful Belgrade 
meeting with Soviet representatives, Edvard 
Kardelj left for Moscow to meet with Iosif Stalin 
personally. Forming joint stock companies was 
a way of post-war bonding between Yugoslavia 
and the USSR; however, as the bonds were 
strengthening, the disagreements were rising. 
In the context of the emerging Eastern Bloc, the 
USSR initiated a process of cultural and 
economic exchange with the countries of 
people’s democracies, adjusting their 
economies to its own five-year economic 
development plan. By the beginning of 1947, 
the Soviet share in their import-export structure 
had increased, the trade agreements were 
signed, new joint stock companies were being 
created and the first economic plans were 
being prepared. The Yugoslav government was 
a leader in this process. The One Year Plan was 
already declared in 1946. While the other 
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Eastern European countries were setting up 
their short-term plans, the proclamation of the 
first Yugoslav Five Year Plan was already in 
order.2 In the course of the process, in 
February 1947, the first Soviet-Yugoslav joint 
stock companies were created, concerning the 
river float and civilian airlines (ed. Dedijer, 
1980, vol.1, pp.113-118). By March, the 
Soviets had resumed a monopoly over the 
firms and were already looking to establish 
more. This time, they were demanding the 
founding of joint production companies in the 
field of metallurgy and oil extraction, that is, in 
the field of heavy industry, which was to be the 
                                                          
2 The other countries of people’s democracies did not 
proclaim their Five Year Plans until The Council for Mutual 
Economic Aid was found in January 1949 in Moscow. In 
1947, when the Five Year Plan was declared in Yugoslavia, 
a Three Year Plan was proclaimed in Hungary, Two Year 
Plans in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and One Year 
Plan in Albania. After the founding of The Council to which 
Yugoslavia was not invited, Five Year Plans were declared in 
Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (1949-1953), Hungary and 
Poland (1950-1954), Romania and Eastern Germany 
(1951-1955), and were based on the same premises as the 
Yugoslav (1947-1952) and the first Soviet Five Year Plan 
(1928-1933) (See Obradović, 1995, pp.103-104).  
base of The Plan. In Kardelj’s later words, this 
presented a problem “for both political and 
economic reasons” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, 
p. 120).3 By 1947, the CPY had already gained 
full political power in the country and the state 
had a monopoly over all the major production 
companies. However, the monopoly itself did 
not enable the organizing and controlling of the 
entire process of economic accumulation and 
reproduction from one centre (Obradović, 
1995, p.83). This was the task of The Plan, and 
in the words of Andrija Hebrang, the 
chairperson of the Economy Council at the 
time: “It is known that the one who holds the 
economy in hand, also holds the power” 
(Obradović, 1995, p.64). However, the 
enforcing of The Plan implied another level of 
centralisation. By demanding to establish joint 
companies in the industrial field specifically, 
the USSR was asking for direct involvement in 
leading the Yugoslav economic plan, that is, its 
                                                          
3 According to Dedijer, forming join companies in the 
field of industry was one of the reasons of the Soviet 
conflict with China, and later with the other Eastern 
European countries as well (see ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol. 
1, pp.117-118; and Feitö, 1971, pp.154, 369-371). 
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share in holding the power. The Soviet terms 
were unacceptable, yet, in an agricultural 
country such as Yugoslavia, Soviet aid was 
necessary for the building of industry. The CPY 
was obviously looking for some other form of 
cooperation, and in that regard, Kardelj’s March 
meeting with Stalin was an unexpected success. 
Halfway through debating the joint companies’ 
issue, Stalin suddenly stopped insisting on his 
previous requests. His new standpoint was: 
“What would it be like not to form new joint 
companies at all, but for us to help you, to give 
you one aluminium factory, one metal factory, 
and to help you in drilling for and refining oil? It 
is clear that joint-venture companies are not an 
adequate form of cooperation with an allied and 
friendly country such as Yugoslavia. There would 
always be disputes, in a way, the independence 
of the country would suffer and friendly relations 
would become corrupted. Those kinds of firms 
are convenient for satellite countries (…). We 
will give you all that on credit, help you with the 
workforce, specialists, and some of it you will 
pay in money, or however you can (…) We still 
have to get something from you too”. (ed. 
Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, pp.120-1) 
Both sides agreed that Soviet aid in building 
Yugoslav industry was to be given in credit 
loans. In the following month, the Law of the 
Five Year Plan was declared and publicly 
celebrated on 1 May 1947. Simultaneously, 
the Yugoslav government had declined the 
Marshall Plan, as did the other Eastern 
European countries. After that, the credit loans 
with the USSR were signed and foreign trade 
was predominantly directed toward the Eastern 
Bloc. The Cominform was created in 
September 1947 in Poland, establishing its 
future base in Belgrade, offering the first 
official post-war political partnering between 
communist parties, and proclaiming that the 
world was divided in two opposing blocks: the 
democratic and the imperialistic (see ed. 
Dedijer, 1980, vol. 1, pp.161-165). By the end 
of the year, the mutual contracts of friendship 
and cooperation were signed among the 
Eastern Bloc countries, implying their military 
cooperation in case of war. Yet at the same 
time, it remained uncertain whether the 
Yugoslav economy would develop in the way 
the CPY had planned, because it became 
unclear if the funds Stalin had promised were 
going to be invested.  
At the beginning of December 1947, the 
Secretary of the Yugoslav Foreign Trade 
Ministry Bogdan Crnobrnja left for Moscow to 
renew the trade agreements that were due to 
expire by April 1948. He was left there waiting 
for nearly two months (ed. Dedijer, 1980, 
vol.1, pp.188-9). On 20 January 1948, he was 
finally received, only to find that the contract 
promised was merely verbal. Two weeks later, 
Kardelj left for Moscow again. This time, Stalin 
issued him with two ultimatums in two days: on 
10 February, the foundation of a Yugoslav-
Bulgarian Federation; and on 12 February, the 
signing of a contract for obligatory consultations 
on foreign political issues (ed. Dedijer, 1980, 
vol.1, pp.168-75, 185-7). Stalin was dissati-
sfied with Kardelj’s indecisiveness. On 26 
February, the Soviet Ministry of Trade declared 
the trade agreements would be delayed until 
December 1948. From that moment on, Soviet 
economic pressure was turning into a full-
blown Yugoslav economic crisis. In March, 
Soviet military and civilian experts were 
withdrawn from Yugoslavia and the facts of the 
Yugoslav-Soviet conflict were exposed 
internationally. By mid-1948 when the first 
Cominform Resolution was declared, 
Yugoslavia found itself in a situation of total 
political and economic isolation from the 
Eastern and the Western Blocs simultaneously.  
The framework of the Soviet criticism was that 
“the class struggle cannot be felt”, as there 
was “a substantial growth of capitalist 
elements in Yugoslav villages” (ed. Dedijer, 
1980, vol.1, pp.204-5). The CPY was also held 
responsible for “a non-programmatic approach 
to Party leadership”. Apparently, its last 
congress had been held in 1928. By 1948, the 
CPY had already introduced a series of 
economic and cultural measures in accordance 
with Soviet practice, yet Yugoslav and Soviet 
systems still differed a great deal. Along with 
the state-owned (državni) and the co-operative 
(zadružni), the 1946 FPRY Constitution still 
allowed the private (privatni) economic sector. 
As for the cultural field, Socialist Realism was 
encouraged by Yugoslav art critics; however, 
the standpoints of Yugoslav cultural field 
officials, architects in particular, were 
ambiguous. In 1947, there were several 
competitions for designing Yugoslav govern-
ment buildings, but the formal characteristics 
of submitted projects still fell into two distinct 
categories: some resembled Modernism, 
others, Socialist Realism. In fact, both were 
equally accepted and discussed by juries 
(Blagojević, 2007, pp.56-188). However, in a 
matter of weeks after the Soviet criticism, a 
new Party line was established. In a plenary 
meeting held on the 12th and 13th of April, the 
CPY abandoned the path of a people’s 
democracy and posed the concepts of class 
struggle and of the socialist character of the 
Yugoslav revolution. The changes in the 
legislative and the public economic field were 
immediate. On 28 April 1948, the Nationali-
zation Law was revised, abolishing all 
industrial companies that were still privately 
owned. On 20 May, the Party decided not to 
take part in the second Cominform meeting 
scheduled for June, thereby avoiding a public 
confession of guilt and instead announced the 
holding of the Fifth Congress on 21 July. The 
CPY also did not abandon the idea of the Plan, 
yet because of the economic sanctions, its 
further implementation would have to be based 
on domestic resources only, that is, on the 
private sector. As “a complete liquidation of 
capitalist assets in the industrial production 
field” had already been conducted (ed. 
Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p.58), in accordance with 
the Soviet criticism, the class struggle and 
internal enemy issues related to the peasants. 
Simultaneously, the building of the Coope-
rative Centres (Zadružni domovi) began, giving 
architecture a new, crucial role in building 
socialism. 
THE PRACTICE: THE BUILDING OF 
FARMING COOPERATIVE CENTRES 
Josip Broz Tito gave the initiative for building 
Cooperative Centres in December 1947 
(Bajalica, 1948; ed. Krunić, 1948). At the same 
time, Crnobrnja had left for Moscow and Soviet 
economic pressure was starting to take place. 
This investment was not provided for – the 
Plan presented detailed building funds and in 
certain domains even the exact number of 
buildings was specified. Yet the document 
contained no data about building the Centres 
either by numbers or by the scope of the 
investment. The building started on April, and 
after the Congress was announced in May, it 
continued in the form of a so-called “pre-
congress competition”. To this day, let alone 
1948, this was one of the largest mass 
building actions in Yugoslavia: the task was to 
build 4,000 units. 
The social significance of the Centres was 
constantly stressed at the time and it was 
closely linked to their architectural programme. 
The buildings consisted of two integrated parts: 
the agricultural-administrative (Zadruga – 
Farming Cooperative Office) and the cultural-
educational section (Dom kulture – Cultural 
Centre). The presumptions behind the given 
partition were the following. Firstly, by building 
such architectural works, the material base for 
future development of the farming cooperative 
sector and Yugoslav agriculture would be 
created. New facilities would accommodate the 
exchange of industrial and agricultural 
products and, therefore, provide the newest 
technical advancements for agricultural 
production (Govor potpretsednika Savezne 
vlade Edvarda Kardelja, 1948). Secondly, the 
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cultural and ideological development of the 
masses would be improved. By building new 
theatres and libraries, peasants would find 
“knowledge, art, scientific and cultural 
entertainment, as well as necessary resting 
places” (Brajović, 1948, pp.28-29). The claim 
that providing technical equipment would 
improve agricultural development is indis-
putable; however, in the present economic 
conditions, there was nearly nothing to 
exchange (see Pavlović, 1997, pp.48-50). The 
purpose of the Plan itself was to improve 
industrial development, that is, to produce 
more machines. Accomplishing this goal by 
foreign trade was not possible at this point. 
Therefore, what was really implied in the above 
theses was that the mere building of the 
Centres would increase the use of mechani-
zation, improve agricultural production and 
initiate cultural development. Clearly, this is 
hardly sustainable anywhere, not to mention 
Yugoslavia in 1948, and equalling architectural 
works to a “material base” was a rather literal 
interpretation of Marx’s thought, particularly in 
times when there were no funds to cover the 
expense of building that material base itself. 
As has been said, the federal government made 
the decision about the number of buildings 
“after considering the material and financial 
possibilities” (Bajalica, 1948, p.6). However, 
those central funds were unlikely to cover any of 
the necessary material requirements for this 
mass enterprise, the general recommendation 
was to collect local resources first (Borba, 
March 29, 1948). The State provided certain 
amounts of steel, glass, cement, and timber, but 
the rest of the construction material, namely, 
sand, stone, lime and bricks had to be 
manufactured and sourced locally due to the 
shortage of gas near construction sites. Having 
to build 4,000 units simultaneously in a matter 
of months also implied having a great number 
of trained construction workers that post-war 
Yugoslavia did not have. Considering the fact 
that they had to be found immediately, some 
were trained on crash-courses and others had 
to learn the trade while on-the-job. In many 
cases, there was no time to wait for federal 
funds at all and the building started without any 
external help. The work was expected to be 
done exclusively by peasants anyway as the 
moving power of the masses and their initiative 
was broadly counted upon.  
Cooperative Centres were designed according 
to a specific typology. The villages were first 
divided into eight categories by number of 
inhabitants, and based on that, eight types of 
projects were made. Such partition was 
supposed to bring new edifices into accord 
with each village’s economic strength. The 
assumption was, in contrast to urban areas, 
rural settlements’ economic power could be 
directly linked to the number of inhabitants. 
That is, the more fertile the land, the more 
people would live there (Kojić, 1973, p.134).  
However, in 1946, all agricultural fields larger 
than 30 hectares (medium sized) had already 
been collectivized and joined to state-held 
farming cooperatives - the majority of villages 
were small and, by the given criteria, 
undeveloped (Petranović, 1980, p.512; Kojić, 
1973, p.151). The mass building of the Centres 
and their eight group sub-division was meant to 
be undertaken in those areas specifically. For 
regions known to be fertile, such as the fields of 
Vojvodina, there were ninth and tenth so-called 
“Super Types” of Centres of a larger capacity 
and with specific programmes (ed. Krunić, 
1948). Consequently, the flaws of the given 
typology were transferred to the Centres’ 
architectural programme and were most 
noticeable when relating to their cultural section. 
Depending on a village’s size, the architects 
were supposed to design eight types of 
buildings. The given programmatic elements 
were the same for all types, differing only in 
the number of rooms and capacity. The 
administrative part consisted of one to two 
stores and service warehouses, one to four 
offices and one warehouse for storing 
agricultural products. As for the cultural 
section, the dominant programmatic element 
was a so-called multipurpose hall intended for 
theatrical plays, films and larger gatherings. 
The first typological inadequacy could be 
found in the case of the halls. They were 
supposed to have 200 seats for type I to 550 
seats for type VIII. Considering a fifty-seat 
difference was too small for halls to be 
classified into different typological categories, 
the attempts to do so were abortive. They were 
designed schematically, with the number of 
seats only approximate to those required by the 
programme or not even drawn on the 
blueprints. The other cultural features were of a 
secondary character. For the first six types only 
a reading room was required, and only for the 
last two types a library, both 30m2. The last 
four types also had one or two “rooms for 
cultural needs” of 20m2. As for service 
facilities, all types had a projectionist’s cabin 
and a coatroom for the audience, named “a 
small coatroom” for the first four types. The 
circulation areas were not defined and the 
programme contained no data about any other 
spaces necessary, thus, in most projects, even 
the sanitary facilities were not drawn in, or they 
were added to the buildings’ exterior later. 
According to the statements of the architects at 
the time, the cultural section of the Centres 
was supposed to be “the focus of the cultural 
revolution of our peasantry” (Macura, 1948, 
p.28). Yet, the programme was given only in 
general terms and, consequently, their projects 
were of the same character. The task of 
preparing the whole enterprise in a matter of 
months also left no time for gathering the 
elementary, economic or technical data. The 
cadastral registers were not used in the design 
process (Pivac, 1951, p.111), and even if they 
had been, they would have been useless, 
again, due to the typology. Likewise, the final, 
detailed designs were never made. The 
construction started by functionally unfinished 
and technically unmarked first drafts on a 
1:200 scale, and although the members of the 
Engineers and Technicians Society of 
Yugoslavia (ETSY) had “made the decision to 
make detailed projects, along with the first 
drafts” (Macura, 1948, p.27), the rush of a 
pre-congress competition made those detailed 
projects remain only a single proposal. 
In total, seventy-five projects of different types 
were accepted, forty-seven of which were for 
mass construction, and the rest belonged to 
the “specific” category. As has been said, the 
tradesmen and engineers had given their best 
in building Cooperative Centres. Trade Union 
members worked on construction sites 
“instead of taking their vacations” and the 
architects designed the projects for free, taking 
on the obligation of surveying the construction 
process by working overtime (Krunić, 1949, 
p.99). However, the participation of experts was 
not decisive in any way, because once the 
building started, the typology according to 
which the projects were initially made, as well 
as those projects themselves, was completely 
neglected. Choosing if and where they were 
going to be built was neither a typology matter 
nor the architects’ concern. 
The key role of preparing and organizing the 
building process was given to Party Committees 
of the Districts (Srez), who were the guardians of 
Party politics and Plan implementation at the 
regional level. Along with Cooperative 
Committees and “the support of the People’s 
Government and Popular Front”, the District 
representatives organized the supply and 
production of construction material, and had the 
power to decide in which villages and sites the 
construction would take place (Bajalica, 1948, 
pp.7-8). Those forty-seven designs the 
architects had made were mere catalogues for 
them to choose from. As a result, the only 
connection the Centres still had to the word 
“typology”, if any, was that some of them were 
chosen to be built more than once.  
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Dragomir Simić’s Project 
In the words of Jovan Krunić, the criteria for 
choosing a project were the following: the need 
for more buildings of a smaller capacity; the 
inexpensiveness (a smaller quantity of material 
required); a good organization of the ground 
plan; and “one important factor was also 
architectural treatment of the building, that is, 
its attractiveness” (Krunić, 1949, p.107). The 
first claim, however, only partially factual – in 
Serbia, two thirds of villages were small, and 
types I, IV and VIII were built the most 
(Table 1). Apparently, large units were more 
expensive to build, but seemingly, they were 
quite attractive as well. The average number of 
sites per project was thirty, however, not all 
designs were equally popular. An unknown 
architect, Dragomir Simić, was the absolute 
winner of the Serbian pre-congress 
competition, although he later only received an 
honorary mention. His design was chosen to 
be built 132 times, while three other projects 
never saw the light of day; Rajko Tatić, an 
eminent pre-war Serbian-national style 
architect, designed one of them (Table 2). 
Simić’s project belonged to the type IV of 
Centres, and in it there were certain differences 
to the given programme. The hall had 255 out 
of 350 seats required along with the reading 
room; there was a library, which was not 
required for this type. The architect apparently 
neglected the typology and found an average 
programmatic solution that contained all the 
features Cooperative Centres could have had. 
This was the first and the last programme 
revision he made.  
If Simić’s design is compared to the other 
projects of the type IV, the application of the 
second and third (economic and functional) 
principle Krunić mentioned becomes clearer. 
In other designs, ground plans were more 
developed; therefore, the circulation areas 
occupied much space, but considering the 
number of seats required for type IV halls, this 
was functionally justified (Figure 1). Yet in 
Simić’s project, the audience areas were kept 
to an absolute minimum, in fact, one could 
almost claim there were not any (Figure 2). 
Although a foyer for at least 200 people was 
necessary, it was not included in the design. 
The visitors were supposed to enter the hall 
through a porch and a vestibule of 12m2 all 
together. The stage area was under-developed, 
with no coatrooms, and in the case of a 
theatrical play, the actors would have to enter 
the stage directly from outside. The situation in 
the administrative part was similar. The users 
were supposed to enter the office directly from 
Table 1. The number of construction sites per type 
Type Sites 
I 916 
IV 636 
VIII 570 
III 212 
II 170 
V 118 
VII 81 
VI 31 
 
Table 2. The number of construction sites per author 
 Type Architect Sites 
1 IV Dragomir Simić 132 
2 I Dimitrije Marinković 120 
3 V Sima Papkov 118 
4 VII Nikola Gavrilović 81 
5 VIII Miodrag Miličević 79 
6 VIII Sima Papkov 79 
7 III Nedeljko Pešić 75 
8 II Nikola Gavrilović 50 
9 IV Jovan Krunić 44 
10 I Dobrosav Pavlović 41 
11 IV Petar Petrušević 36 
12 I Branislav Marinković 35 
13 II Nedeljko Pešić 35 
14 I Ljudmila Krat 33 
15 VIII Nikola Lalić 32 
16 III Aleksandar Šegvić 31 
17 VI Tehn. Sergije Vihrov 31 
 
 
Figure 1. Radovan Tršić, Kolkhoz Centre of the IV type, elevation, plan, 1948.  Krunić, J. (ed.) (1948) Zadružni domovi: 
zbirka projekata masovne izgradnje na teritoriji uže Srbije, Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine i Autonomne Kosovsko 
Metohijske oblasti u 1948. godini. Beograd: Zadružna knjiga, p. 29. 
 
 
Figure 2. Dragomir Simić, Kolkhoz Centre of the IV type, elevation, plan, first storey, 1948.  Krunić, J. (ed.) (1948) 
Zadružni domovi: zbirka projekata masovne izgradnje na teritoriji uže Srbije, Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine i Autonomne 
Kosovsko Metohijske oblasti u 1948. godini. Beograd: Zadružna knjiga, p. 27. 
Živančević J.: Soviet in Content - People’s in Form: The Building of Farming Cooperative Centres and the Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, 1948-1950 
 
spatium  43 
the porch and go through it to enter the other 
one. However, given the programme did not 
define facilities and circulation areas, although 
they are required for any architectural design, 
the architect did not feel any obligation to 
provide them, and in that regard he made no 
revision of the programme whatsoever. Thus, if 
the intention behind the project had been to 
provide adequate spaces for the administrative 
and cultural needs of users, its plan would 
have been graded as unsuccessful. Yet, if the 
goal had been to build the largest number of 
units in the shortest period of time, with the 
minimum quantity of material available, 
comfortable audience spaces could have been 
sacrificed. Simić designed the most 
economical and, therefore, the best plan by 
which the architectural programme was more 
than fulfilled. It had literally all the program-
matic elements of type IV with a library 
included; thus the requirements were complied 
with more than a 100%. The project was 
perhaps atypical for a certain group of villages, 
but it was made typical by its success. It was 
the average, most acceptable solution at the 
time, and in the circumstances, was of a new, 
high quality. As for the fourth aspect, the 
buildings’ “attractiveness”, that was realized 
too. The architect achieved a maximum 
representational quality by the minimal use of 
formal elements and again, with minimal 
material requirements. Its prominent side was 
formed by a second storey balcony exit, placed 
above the porch framed by arches (Figure 3a, 
b). At the time, the arched porch was found to 
be consistent with Yugoslav vernacular 
architecture and the Socialist-Realist “national 
in form” concept (Figure 4a, b, c). 
The Porch 
According to Krunić (1949, p.98), the building 
of the Centres was tightly connected to the tasks 
of the Plan. However, according to the Plan, they 
were never provided for (Borba, May 1, 1947). 
Furthermore, the whole enterprise was poorly 
prepared, and once the construction started, an 
untrained workforce built the units. It was 
physically impossible for the architects to visit, 
let alone inspect and survey the building 
process on each of the 4,000 sites, and 
alongside the given typology, almost every 
project had to be adjusted to terrain 
configuration, locally available material, techni-
cal conditions or “the opinions of those, who 
decided on the spot” (Pivac, 1951, p.111). 
Those additional adjustments surely used much 
more time and material, which could have been 
saved if only a basic analysis had been 
conducted previously. Apparently, the savings 
were not a truly decisive factor in the process, 
and perhaps the appropriate words here would 
be the rush to build, followed, paradoxically. by 
wastefulness. So if the primary assumption 
behind building those units was to adjust their 
architectural programme to economic 
conditions of villages in order to initiate the 
advancement of the Cooperative economy, 
enforce a cultural revolution, and fulfil the tasks 
of the Plan, it could be considered either as 
unsuccessful or as demagogic. From the 
starting point of planning, through the 
designing, up to the construction phase, the 
development of the villages was never taken 
into any serious consideration, and the whole 
enterprise was of an unplanned character. 
Yet, if the architectural treatment of 
Cooperative Centres is considered, there is a 
segment that was typical for all the projects, 
although it was not required by the programme. 
Krunić (1949, p.99) mentioned that porches 
were first supposed to be built in wood in order 
to mimic vernacular architecture, but due to the 
shortage of timber, this aspect was also given 
up on. However, there was no giving up on 
building porches, they were constructed in 
brick and concrete that was insufficient for 
constructing the buildings alone. Evidently, the 
use of vernacular elements was silently 
understood among architects, as well as in the 
building process, although all the economic 
and organizational conditions for building 
details like these were extremely unfavourable. 
Far more important functional aspects were 
willingly neglected repeatedly, and the porches 
were not necessary either for construction 
purposes or by functional requirements, this 
last is evident from Simić’s project. Building 
these elements surely required more time, 
money and material, especially when an 
unqualified workforce was employed (Figure 
5). Seemingly, in the case of the porch, whose 
role was exclusively representational and in 
accordance with a “national in form, socialist 
in content” slogan, the economic aspect had 
suddenly lost key significance. The task was, 
apparently, to build the largest number of 
units, with the minimum of means available, 
Figure 4a. Village house, Pomoravlje, Serbia. Deroko, A. 
(1968) Narodno neimarstvo I. Beograd: SANU 
 
Figure 4b. The State Museum, Baku, Azerbaijan. Mac, I. 
L.  (1946) Opštenarodna demokratska načela sovjetske 
arhitekture, Tehnika, No. 4-5, p. 122 
 
Figure 4c. Kolkhoz Centre, Novi Vrbas, Vojvodina. Krunić, 
J. (ed.) (1948) Zadružni domovi: zbirka projekata 
masovne izgradnje na teritoriji uže Srbije, Autonomne 
Pokrajine Vojvodine i Autonomne Kosovsko Metohijske 
oblasti u 1948. godini. Beograd: Zadružna knjiga, p. 77.  
 
 
 
Figures 3a and 3b. Dragomir Simić, Kolkhoz Centre of the 
IV type, exterior view, Omašnica, Trstenik District, 2007. 
Author’s photographic archive 
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but with specific formal characteristics, all by 
the time the Congress began. Considering the 
Congress was a programmatic and referen-
dum-like event, it can be assumed that Centres 
were built for propaganda purposes. If so, the 
problem is - what were the porches supposed 
to propagate in a specific, Yugoslav socio-
political context? 
THE THEORY: NATIONAL IN FORM, 
OR MACHTBILDUNG 
Speaking of Cooperative Centres, Krunić (1949, 
p.99) claimed the architects were using 
vernacular forms in order to achieve two goals: 
they “tried to adjust to people’s [narodna] 
architecture by form and to local conditions by 
material”. Macura (1948, p.29) explained the 
two aspects more thoroughly. Firstly, the 
Centres were supposed to “gain a suitable 
character and appearance”, since their number 
“imposed a danger of their resembling 
standardized, monotonous elements”, and 
therefore “a danger for their architectural value 
to be below the value which the significance and 
the role of Cooperative economy presupposes”. 
Secondly, the architects tried to adjust the 
buildings in appearance as well as by material, 
to local, namely, geographic and climatic 
conditions, as well as “certain specificities of 
people’s architecture of certain areas”.  
Both architects separate the two aspects: “form” 
and “people’s architecture” on the one hand, 
and “material” and “the local conditions” on the 
other. The second attempt, adjusting to local 
conditions by material was inevitable, because 
the locally available materials had to be used 
for construction in any case. However, 
adjusting to aspects of local architecture was 
not possible, again, due to the given typology. 
The criterion of the number of inhabitants said 
nothing of a villages’ location or its 
architecture; hence, the architects could not 
have known where their projects were going to 
be built. Therefore, adjusting to local 
architecture is one matter, but adjusting to 
“people’s architecture by form” in order to 
express “a suitable character”, is something 
else. Quite another thing was to give those 
buildings a national form. 
According to Bratislav Stojanović (1947-1948, 
p.14), national forms were coming from the 
people, therefore, they were the easiest way to 
bring architecture nearer to the masses and to 
develop the people’s creative forces 
simultaneously. As Ivan Čolović (1993, p.83) 
noted, the political vocabulary in which the key 
word is “the people”, combined with invoking 
folklore, has a familiar intent in mind. In the 
eyes of the majority, folklore subjects and 
forms legitimize political and military actions. 
They “suggest (connote) the idea that the 
messages and emotions transmitted by that 
speech are inevitably the echo of the voice, of 
the expression, of people’s will”, moreover, 
“that the sender of the political message is the 
people itself”. Quite similarly, in 1948 Branko 
Maksimović (1948, p. 75) wrote: 
“By creating works of architecture we will learn 
that they belong to the people and that masses of 
people rightfully expect of our new architecture to 
fully express their wishes and aspirations toward a 
better and more joyful life, to sketch out our path 
to socialism as clearly as possible.”4 
The intent behind invoking folklore, however, is 
of a dualistic character. It is used not only to 
legitimize political projects in the eyes of the 
people, but also to a foreign audience. By 
stressing the differences between local tradition 
and a neighbours’ culture it claims political 
independence; by looking for similarities, it 
claims the right to a political conjunction into 
one common state (Čolović, 1993, pp.88-9).  
The Soviet case was, as ever, contradictory. The 
differences of local traditions were not stressed 
because there was a claim for political 
separation; on the contrary, they were supposed 
to create conditions for their merging into one 
culture. As Greg Castillo noticed (1997, pp.91-
6), this was not a mere political proclamation, 
but Stalin’s consciously constructed dialectical 
logic. It was the expressing of non-Russian 
                                                          
4 “Učićemo se da stvarajući arhitektonska dela mislimo 
na to da ona pripadaju narodu i da narodne mase s 
pravom očekuju da naša nova arhitektura što punije 
izražava njihove želje i stremljenja ka boljem i 
radosnijem životu, da što jasnije ocrtava naš put u 
socijalizam”. 
peoples’ national identity that contrasted and, 
consequently, propagated Russia’s development 
and progress - its mission civilatricе was 
supposed to encourage them back to join 
Russia. Stalin’s logic was later transferred to the 
theory of Socialist Realism, and in the mid 
1930s, the architects were called to apply the 
idiom “national in form, socialist in content”. 
However, how this aphorism was to be translated 
into built form was by no means obvious, and 
the main reason for the confusion lay in the 
theoretical bases of Socialist Realism itself.  
As with all the other Soviet arts, the 
architecture of Socialist Realism was supposed 
to be concurrent with Gorky’s definition given 
for literature, by which writers were expected to 
offer “the truthful, historically concrete 
representation of reality in its revolutionary 
development” (quoted after Tertz, 1965, 
p.148). The Statute of The Union of Soviet 
Architects (1937) stated: “Soviet architecture 
must aspire to create the edifices that are 
technically perfect, economical and beautiful, 
that reflect the joy of socialist life and the 
greatness of the ideas and goals of our epoch” 
(quoted after Ostrogović, 1947-1948, p.3). In 
addition, Andrei Zhdanov explained the way of 
achieving these goals. The artists were 
supposed to use “various means” in choosing 
“the best of what all the previous epochs have 
ever created” (Ždanov, 1934, p.181). 
According to the upper broad definitions, no 
strict guidelines had been bestowed upon 
Soviet artists, yet, in the spirit of Stalin’s 
dialectical logic, this did not imply they had 
enjoyed absolute freedom. Clearly given 
instructions could have been easily followed, 
but the fact there were not any opened up 
broad possibilities for finding artists’ 
“mistakes” whenever there was a new Party 
line to be implemented. Seemingly, that vast 
openness gave rise for the absolute freedom of 
the Party on the one hand, and for total 
repression for the artists on the other. 
However, in literature and the fine arts it was at 
least known that the motives of building 
socialism were to be portrayed in realistic 
form. In architecture, it was by no means clear 
how to reflect “the joy of socialist life” in 
formal terms, nor was this ever cleared up in 
its theory. In fact, the theorists were primarily 
dedicated to erase any stable grounds for 
architectural production. Soviet architecture 
was supposed to use “its shapes, its 
compositional means of expression, its 
picturesque language” (Ostrogović, 1947-
1948, p.4), but those compositional means 
were never actually defined. In the early 1930s, 
during the First Five Year Plan, there was a task 
of finding the Soviet style; so Ivan Fomin 
 
Figure 5. The porch, Veliki Dupci, Rasina District, 2007. 
Author’s photographic archive.  
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laboured to invent a “Red Doric order”, while 
others opted for historical revivals of Egypt, 
Pompeii and Renaissance Florence (Castillo, 
1997, pp.100-1). Yet at the same time, the 
theorists claimed Socialist Realism was “not a 
style but a method” (Kuk, 2000, p.513), and 
the features of Soviet architecture were not to 
be pursued in some “formalistic compositional 
principles”, that is, in the styles alone 
(Ostrogović, 1947-1948, p.5). The finding of 
the Soviet style was guaranteed for the future, 
because it was taken as a scientific fact that the 
same thing had happened before in all great 
epochs of architecture. This also meant the 
style could not have been created instantly, it 
was supposed to grow “organically” and to be 
in accordance with the epoch of socialism. 
Like socialism, which was said to be a 
transitional period toward communism, 
architecture was in “a difficult period of 
searching for the new forms” (Ostrogović, 
1947-1948, p.5). In the meantime, the basic 
principle that was supposed to guide the 
architects was “the critical assimilation of 
heritage” (Kuk, 2000, p.513), with the key 
word here being the ”critical”. The Party’s 
criticism was enabling the architects to catch 
up with the ever-changing Soviet economic 
and political measures for their work to remain 
in accordance with socialist reality in its 
revolutionary development. Therefore, the 
Soviet style was never determined, but the 
architecture of Socialist Realism remained 
open for further interpretations.  
In the second half of the 1930s, after the huge 
wave of collectivisation, there was a change of 
ideas. After the delegates of The Second All-
Union Congress of Collective Farm Shock 
Workers were said to have lobbied for a 
showplace for collective agriculture, in 
February 1935 Stalin duly approved the 
preparations for The All-Union Agricultural 
Exhibition (Castillo, 1997, pp.100-1). In the 
course of that action, there was “a determined 
approach towards national heritage” among 
architects, who were not looking for a unified 
(national) style anymore, but for an archi-
tecture unified with “the traditions of the 
vernacular building and the national forms of 
the peoples of the USSR” (Mac, 1946, p.120). 
Thereby, the theoretical base of Soviet 
architecture was redefined, as it was now a part 
of “a multinational social organism: unified 
and socialist in content, and various and 
national in form” (Mac, 1946, p.120). Yet 
again, the confusion about what constituted a 
national heritage was well founded, because, if 
for no other reason, Azerbaijani architects were 
being exhorted to learn from the treasure of 
native tradition, while their millennial shrine of 
Bibi Eyat outside Baku was dynamited as a part 
of a road construction project (Castillo, 1997, 
pp.100-1). Nevertheless, this time, the call for 
national forms was answered persuasively, 
because the process of their creation was no 
longer depending on architects themselves, 
nor was architecture left to develop “organi-
cally”. For the purposes of the Exhibition, 
“national forms” were systematically con-
structed by bringing hundreds of craftsmen 
from all Soviet republics to Moscow to work 
with architects. There the vernacular material 
was cleansed of all nationalistic and religious 
content until the only thing left was a 
picturesque residue, which was joined with 
Soviet symbols and shipped back to the 
countries of origin in a form of national 
architecture (Castillo, 1997, pp.107-8). The 
same thing had happened with the Soviet 
concept of nationality which, in the words of 
Laura Olson (2000, pp.3-4), had nothing in 
common with the one from pre-socialist days. 
It was allowed to remain because it 
represented only “form”. 
The case of post-war Yugoslavia was, again, 
somewhat different. The vagueness of 
theoretical claims of Socialist Realism was 
used by Yugoslav architects in the same 
manner of giving the interpretations that were 
currently needed. Although the “national in 
form” slogan was often stressed, there were no 
formal distinctions in the Centres across 
different republics, and although this was 
mostly because of their building processes, 
that cannot be interpreted as its sole 
consequence. Critical discussions and political 
speeches of the time were typically confusing 
or equating the terms narodno (people’s) and 
nacionalno (national) - as Mira Krajgher (1948, 
p.128) wrote: “Between people’s artefacts and 
our contemporary architecture, the culture, 
socialist in content and national in form, is also 
subjected to the law of development”. When 
writing about Cooperative Centres, the 
architects were stressing the attempt to “adjust 
to people’s architecture by form” in order to 
express their character and significance, but 
there is not a single article in which it was 
claimed that their national character should 
have been expressed. The fact that the problem 
of nationality was not verbalized clearly does 
not imply national issues did not exist in post-
war Yugoslavia; quite the contrary. Yet, in 
theory, as well as in practice, these differences 
were not made. Unlike in the USSR where the 
national identity problem was systematically 
solved, in Yugoslavia the problem was, at least 
in 1948, systematically overlooked.  
In the short period allocated to the design 
process, Yugoslav architects were supposed to 
find a formula by which the “national in form” 
slogan was to be quickly applied to built form. 
The number of units demanded for typical 
designs, and the way the projects were planned, 
chosen and built annulled any of their previous 
character. After all the adjustments made on 
sites, of the seventy-five initial designs there 
were literally 4,000 units with every single one 
of them different from the other. The only one 
element still typical was “the form” of the porch. 
The process of cleansing the ideological content 
was a systemic consequence, but while the 
Soviet result was achieved by constructing, the 
Yugoslav case was the Soviet version in reverse 
– dismantling. In Soviet architecture, Russia was 
an “unrepresented” nation, and expressing the 
differences of the other republics was merely 
declaratory; in Yugoslavia there were different 
nationalities that were unrepresented, while the 
formal architectural type remained, it was 
narodni because it was common for the entire 
country. The one thing that was not produced in 
practice was the “national in form” concept, it 
was stressed “formally”, as a mere declaration. 
Still, the whole enterprise was led by a 
consciously constructed dialectical logic, which 
had little to do with the problem of nationality 
because, in a given political moment, this issue 
was not a major significance.  
A Dialectical Logic of Propaganda 
On November 1978, Tito spoke of the Soviet-
Yugoslav dispute and mentioned that “the 
USSR was supposed to play a role (…) 
particularly in using its success for propaganda 
purposes” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.1, p.249). 
Tito’s remark concerned the fact that, starting 
from 1945, the popularising of the USSR was 
the corner stone of CPY propaganda 
(Manojlović Pintar, 2005). Still, the reasons for 
insisting on the same political demeanour 
once the conflict had escalated, and in times of 
economic sanctions, can be interpreted from 
different standpoints. Firstly, by explaining to 
whom the propaganda was intended. 
Hannah Arendt (1998, pp.350-1) wrote that 
totalitarian movements exist in a world that is 
not totalitarian by itself, so they are forced to 
appeal to propaganda. This activity is always 
directed to the exterior sphere, either to non-
totalitarian layers of the population or to non-
totalitarian countries, and whenever a 
totalitarian doctrine is in conflict with 
propaganda intended for abroad, it is explained 
as a “temporary tactical manoeuvre” to those 
inside. The thesis can be compared to Tito`s 
quote; supposedly, the intention of the CPY 
was to use the authority of the USSR inside the 
country, when it is more likely that, after 1948 
at least, it was directed to the outside, back to 
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the Soviet Union. All the changes made in 
Yugoslav law and economy were a declaration of 
consistency to Soviet principles; likewise, by 
using vernacular elements in Cooperative 
Centres their Soviet character was intended. On 
the other hand, the constant invoking of “the 
people” and “people’s forms” speaks enough 
about to whom the internal aspect of propaganda 
was intended. However, propaganda purposes 
do not explain the fact that there were 4,000 
Centres in the building process in 1948. It is 
questionable whether “the language” of 
architecture, namely, referencing Soviet or 
folklore forms, could be reason enough for the 
Party to impose the difficult task of building 
thousands of buildings on itself, even in political 
and economic conditions already unfavourable 
for its staying in power. It appears the 
presumable role of the architecture of Socialist 
Realism does not end completely if taken solely 
in the post-modern sense Mikhail Epstein 
(1998) wrote about, respectively. 
According to Arendt (1998, p. 369, 371), the 
real goal of totalitarian propaganda is not 
persuading, but organizing, the accumulation of 
power (Machtbildung). The masses are not 
conquered by a momentary success of 
demagogy, but by “a visible reality” and “the 
power of living organization”. The ideology 
cannot be either “transferred” or “taught”, but 
only “exercised” and “practiced”. As Kardelj 
argued at the Fifth Congress, the important 
feature of the Yugoslav public economy’s 
socialist transformation was “creating an 
organizational form and a material technical 
base which would change the small-self soul of 
a peasant day-to-day” (V kongres KPJ i zadružne 
organizacije, 1948). The significance of new 
farming cooperative economies in achieving that 
goal was stressed by Aleksandar Ranković, 
Interior Affairs Minister, who claimed they 
presented “a very convenient form through 
which the Party (…) practically helps the 
masses (…) to mobilize against capitalist 
elements in the villages” (ed. Dedijer, 1980, 
vol.1, p.383). After that, Dimitrije Bajalica 
(1948, p.8), the Secretary of the Farming 
Cooperative Economy Committee, said the 
Centres themselves were “a material technical 
base” for achieving socialism in the countryside, 
a base which “with proper organizational-
propaganda work (…) will help the masses to 
persuade themselves by their own experience of 
the need and the necessity of that road for a 
better and happier life”. That was also the long-
term significance of those buildings: “Mere 
building of Centres (…) creates new organizers 
and managers of public economy, raises the 
faith in the power of association and enforces 
the consciousness of Cooperative members”.   
As it happens, these were not merely political 
proclamations. If it had been propaganda only, 
in all probability there would have been no need 
for building 4,000 units in the given economic 
conditions. However, the lack of funds was not 
the failing point of the whole process, but a 
prerequisite, its driving power, enforced by the 
task of building thousands of units 
simultaneously. By not providing the material 
and the funds required, the Party was mobilising 
all the material and human resources available. 
The engineers were designing (although their 
projects were not followed); the tradesmen were 
sent to villages (although their help was of minor 
significance); but most importantly, the peasants 
were gathering, producing material and building 
the units. The action had mobilized all the levels 
of society to mass labour, and they were doing it 
pro bono, out of their own resources - after all, 
they were said to be building for themselves 
anyway. Contrary to other arts, the one feature 
architecture could provide in the whole process 
was a “living organization”, with its key focus 
shifted from “the buildings” to “the people”, and 
through it, the Party was practicing the same 
dialectical Soviet model it was criticized for not 
being consistent with. On the one hand, this 
showed people’s support to the outside. As 
Bajalica (1948, p.8) stressed just before the 
Congress: “Millions of work hours given [by 
masses of people] in this pre-congress 
competition speak of (…) their love for the 
Party”. Yet more importantly, the Soviet criticism 
left the Party unsure of the people’s responses. It 
was in a position of preserving power and, as 
Yugoslav representatives argued themselves, 
while the CPY was organizing, the people were 
practicing and learning. Their involvement in the 
act of building gave the Centres a character no 
architect or form could ever manage to express - 
a didactic one. To paraphrase Slavoj Žižek’s 
(1999, p.28) insight, the most elementary 
definition of ideology was given by Marx: they 
did not know it, they were doing it (Figure 6). 
The Building of Socialist Realism 
A small number of Centres were finished 
before the Congress. For example, in the Nisus 
district thirty-eight were under construction, 
but by July 1948 only three of them were 
roofed, and the walls were almost finished on 
two (Bajalica, 1948, p.7). Yet, the mere fact 
construction had started was more than enough 
for the Party to make a number of consecutive 
assumptions. The material base was set; 
therefore, the building of the new socialist 
society had already begun. In Bajalica’s words 
before the Congress (1948, p. 8): 
“By building the Cooperative Centres with their 
libraries and reading rooms, the conditions of 
the kolkhoz villages of the great country of 
socialism have are being created in our 
countryside too. The Centres are going to 
become lighthouses which will constantly light 
up our villages with rays of socialism, and on 
the base of science of Marxism-Leninism, and 
using the 30-year- experience of the Soviet 
Union, in our conditions help create a new, 
socialist countryside.” 
By the same principle, the Centres’ strongpoint 
in practice, or rather, in reality, along with their 
formal side, was used for declaring that 
Socialist Realism is dominant in Yugoslav 
architecture. In his Congress speech, Radovan 
Zogović (1948, p.56), a leader of the Serbian 
agitprop department, condemned “decadence 
and formalism” of Modern architecture and 
claimed Socialist Realism is more appropriate 
for building a new, socialist society. This was 
the first official proclamation of Socialist 
Realism in the post-war period by a political 
authority. As Maksimović (1947-1948, pp.15-
16) wrote, the same happened in the USSR in 
the 1930s, it was those “gigantic tasks of 
planned building” that posed new conditions 
“for building architecture on solid, healthy 
bases”, and for rejecting tendencies which 
were “rooted in capitalism, in the deterioration 
of architecture, and turning it into a bare 
technicism”.  
The Party’s proclamations were then followed 
by an institutional reply: the October 
Resolution of the Second Congress of ETSY 
stated that the architects accept the Central 
Committee’s directives and concluded: 
“To discard notions of architecture brought 
down to a mere solving of the utilitarian, 
narrow-technical components as in capitalist 
countries, and to demand the correct fulfilment 
of functional component and artistic-
ideological component of an architectural work 
at the same instance. (…) 
To devote all the attention necessary to 
Figure 6. Peasants on construction site, Novi Vrbas, 
Vojvodina, 1948. Učešće sekcije arhitekata Beograda DIT-a 
NR Srbije u akciji izgradnje zadružnih domova (1949) 
Tehnika, No. 2-3, p. 97. 
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acquainting, studying, evidencing, conserving 
and publicizing research results of the 
architectural heritage of our past.5 (Rezolucija 
sekcije arhitekata na II. Kongresu inženjera i 
tehničara Jugoslavije, 1948)”  
After that, while speaking of the Centres in 
April 1949, Krunić (1949, p.99) made the 
following rationalization:  
“If someone would think that the projects of 
our Cooperative Centres are not 
“contemporary”, because they do not have any 
windows and flat roofs, then we would respond 
that the measure of contemporariness and 
quality of their form is not the use of elements 
of Western-European grasping of things, but 
the use of elements that are a real expression 
of our possibilities and needs, which are in 
their scope, and which are in the service of the 
broadest strata of the working masses. Such 
architecture is a document and an expression 
of its time and, therefore, is quality 
architecture. And not only that, the enormity 
and the broadest significance of this action, 
which cannot even be imagined in a bourgeois 
society should be emphasized as well, its 
breadth and general usefulness for people 
implies the socialist content of our 
architecture. From the standpoint of form, it is 
a contribution to the process of creating the 
expression of Socialist Realism which has 
begun.”6  
Before they were even built, the Centres were 
proof that the reality was “accurately shown” 
by which, as Karel Teige (1977, pp.305-6) 
wrote in his definitions of Socialist Realism, 
they immediately drew “a positive assessment 
of the formal side”, and showed “evidence of 
perfection in its realization”. Moreover, that 
same formal side was proof that they are 
Socialist Realism, without mentioning, of 
                                                          
5 Odbaciti shvatanja o arhitekturi koja se svode na puko 
rešavanje utilitarnih uskotehničkih komponenata, kako se to 
pojavljuje u kapitalističkim zemljama, i tražiti, da se u isti 
čas pravilno udovolji funkcionalnoj komponenti i umetničko 
idejnoj komponenti arhitektonskog dela. (...) Posvetiti svu 
pažnju upoznavanju, izučavanju, snimanju, konzerviranju i 
objavljivanju rezultata proučavanja našeg arhitektonskog 
nasleđa iz prošlosti. 
6 Ako bi se nekome činilo da projekti naših zadružnih 
domova nisu “savremeni”, jer nemaju prozora i ravne 
krovove, onda bi tu odgovorili da merilo savremenosti i 
kvaliteta forme nisu upotreba elemenata zapadnoevropskog 
shvatanja, nego upotreba elemenata koji su realan izraz 
naših mogućnosti i potreba i koji su u njihovoj razmeri, a 
koji su u službi najširih slojeva radnih masa. Takva 
arhitektura dokument je i izraz svoga vremena, a samim tim i 
kvalitetna arhitektura. Ne samo to, ovde treba istaći 
ogromnost i najširi značaj ove akcije, koji se ne može ni 
zamisliti u buržoaskom društvu, a čija širina i opšte narodna 
korist znači socijalističku sadržinu naše arhitekture. Sa 
gledišta forme, ona je doprinos u započetom procesu 
stvaranja izraza socijalističkog realizma.  
course, the detail of “national in form”. 
Paradoxically, the architectural practice itself 
provided a material base for political 
propaganda, but it managed to establish new 
theoretical claims about and upon itself only 
through it. In addition, the politics-practice-
theory concept of building Socialist Realism in 
Yugoslav architecture was just a starting point 
for the other arts. The pre-congress compe-
tition was referring to photographers, artists 
and art students as well, as they were all sent 
to construction sites throughout Yugoslavia. 
Consequently, there was a thematic change in 
Yugoslav painting also, the motifs of People’s 
Liberation War were swiftly set aside by motifs 
of building the new socialist society (Figure 
7a, b, c, d). The most distinguished case of 
that process was the sudden star-status of 
previously unknown painter Boža Ilić (Merenik, 
2001, pp. 21-47). At the end of 1948, his 
Probing the Terrain of New Belgrade was a 
huge success, and is considered a canonical 
example of Socialist Realism in Yugoslav fine 
arts to this day.  
The Year 1949 
In Arendt’s words (1998, p.370), totalitarian 
leaders choose elements from reality to isolate 
and generalize them until they construct a 
world that can be on equal terms with the real 
one. However, they constantly add the power of 
organization to the weak and unreliable voice of  
their arguments, and the more their power is 
resisted by the outside, the stronger is the 
terror on the inside.  
In December 1948, the Soviets declared the 
trade agreements were not going to be 
renewed at all and it became clear that political 
and economic relations with the USSR were 
not going to be improved no matter what the 
CPY did (ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp. 4-6, 20-
21, 673). In 1949, for the first time after the 
war, the media image relating to the USSR 
started to change. The number of favourable 
articles was decreasing as border incidents 
with the eastern neighbours were increasing; 
and along with their first culmination in March, 
the first critical articles were published 
(Dobrivojević and Miletić, 2004). Yet, even 
though the popularising of the USSR was 
stopped, the implementation of Soviet methods 
did not; in fact, it was enforced even more. In 
January, after the Second Plenum of the CPY, 
the Yugoslav economy was reoriented again 
(ed. Dedijer, 1980, vol.2, pp.13-16), but 
contrary to the previous impulsive manner of 
handling things, the mobilization of the 
workforce and the liquidation of kulaks as a 
class acquired a planned approach. The 
Figure 7a. The building of the New Belgrade, 1948. 
Dobrović, N. (1948) Izgradnja Novog Beograda, 
Jugoslavija SSSR, No. 33, p. 8.  
 
Figure 7b. Frano Baće, Skice sa Omladinske pruge 
(Sketches of the Youth Railroad), 1947. Likovni umjetnici 
iz NRH na omladinskoj pruzi (1947-1948) Arhitektura, 
No. 4-6, p. 53. 
 
 
Figure 7c. Ismet Mujezinović, Mješalica (The Cement 
Mixer), 1948. Jugoslavija SSSR (1948), No. 30, second 
unnumbered page. 
 
Figure 7d. Boža Ilić, Sondiranje terena na Novom 
Beogradu (Probing the Terrain of New Belgrade), 1948.  
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number of Farming Cooperatives started to rise 
right after Kardelj (1948, p.7) quoted Stalin’s 
“successes achieved should not make us dizzy 
nor put us to sleep” at the Fifth Congress; 
however, after the Plenum their number 
increased by 600% in 1949 (Table 3, Graph 1). 
With a reality base now set and left behind, no 
material sources left and no obligation to 
respond to anyone, mobilization per se was the 
goal. In 1949, the system was organizing the 
only thing it had left - the people. 
THE U-TURN: TAKING ON A NEW 
FORM OF SOCIALISM 
By November 1949, Stalin was still persisting 
in his accusations; only this time, he was 
aiming at the intensifying negotiations between 
the CPY and the West (ed. Dedijer, 1980, 
vol.2, pp.535-9). In December, the first trade 
and loan agreements were signed with Great 
Britain and the USA, and simultaneously, 
Kardelj (Govor druga Edvarda Kardelja na 
svečanom zasedanju slovenske Akademije 
znanosti i umjetnosti, 1949) declared “from 
now on (…) science is free”. From then on, 
there was an economic and cultural 
reorganization perhaps even more revolutionary 
than the one in 1945. In June 1950, the Party 
decentralized itself, and in July, it proclaimed 
the first self-management act. This led to a u-
turn in all public fields. The First Conference of 
Architects and Urban Planners of the FPRY was 
held in November. The architects confessed 
their errors from the previous period, stating, 
among other things, that the Centres were an 
expensive and luxurious way of building, not 
suitable for the given land and climatic 
conditions or their functional requirements. As 
for Socialist Realism, it was not mentioned 
even once, its abandonment was silently 
understood behind Krunic’s words (1950, p. 
170, 175) such as that “our architectural 
expression is specific in form”, and “we think 
that it is unworthy, illogical and utterly absurd 
to literally copy ready-made architectural 
expressions or urban planning formulas”. 
Socialist Realism became a pejorative term in 
the subsequent years marked by residential 
architecture and Modernism, while previously 
unfinished government buildings were being 
dressed in the new, Western fashion (Kulić, 
2007). The systematic dismantling was 
happening once again, and as all recent 
“results” were being erased, a new form of 
socialism was adopted. Those legacies were 
followed until Tito’s death in 1980 when the 
whole process started again, only in a post-
modern epoch that transmitted a new 
“language” for expressing national tendencies 
(Lujak, 2010; Živančević, 2008). However, 
those were only formal adjustments; the urban 
planning methods were still exactly the same 
(Bajić Brković, 2002), and the political 
circumstances have remained an important 
factor in architectural practice to this day 
(Đokić and Nikezić, 2007). It is reasonable to 
ask if it were the events of 1948 that posed a 
material base for the socialist-realist approach 
of always finding out different forms, while an 
underlying method of doing so remained 
essentially soviet.  
As for the Centres, after 1950 they were not built 
anymore - many were left unfinished or their 
“socialist content” was changed (Ilić, 1969; 
Nikolić and Ivanišević, 1970). Some were used 
as cinemas and village schools; numerous 
others became warehouses, or they were simply 
left abandoned, becoming monuments of the 
time when, politically, they had served their 
purpose, and when their socialist role, once 
promised, was never fulfilled. 
CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the common interpretations by 
which the events of 1948 were the starting 
point of the so-called “de-Stalinisation” of the 
CPY and therefore the “decentralisation” of 
Yugoslav economy and culture (see Lasić, 
1970, p. 269), it is more likely the Soviet-
Yugoslav dispute initiated a shift toward 
enforcing the Soviet model even more 
thoroughly. Moreover, it appears it were the 
Soviet methods that helped construct a new 
thesis, of “the third way” of Yugoslav 
socialism. The role of architecture in the 
process was crucial. Architectural practice was 
the material basis for building socialism, not 
necessarily for the development of the 
Yugoslav economy, but for mobilising the 
people for fulfilling the Party’s political 
interests and the constructing of its ideological 
discourse. In that regard, the buildings 
themselves were functional in many aspects 
except one - the usefullness for the people 
they were said to be built for. The 
transformation of Yugoslav architecture towards 
Modernism after 1950 was again made in 
accordance with the change in the Party 
politics, which still left it in the realm of the 
theory of Socialist Realism. It was still the 
reflection of the ever developing, and therefore, 
ever changing socialist society. Because of 
that, the question remains: was “the third way“ 
of Yugoslav architecture, namely Socialist 
Modernism or Socialist Aestheticism, simply a 
part of the official political construction that hid 
the fact it was still Soviet in content and 
modernist only in form?  
Acknowledgements 
I whish to thank the two anonymous reviewers for 
their comments and suggestions on earlier drafts 
of this article, particularly the reviewer who made 
the effort to help me in the final editing. I am 
indebted to Ryan Allain for his generous support 
and help on proofreading this paper. 
References 
Arent, H. (1998) Izvori totalitarizma. Beograd: 
Feministička izdavačka kuća. 
Bajalica, D. (1948) Izgradnja zadružnih domova u 
našoj zemlji, Jugoslavija SSSR, No. 35, pp. 6-8. 
Bajić Brković, M. (2002) Urbanističko planiranje 
u Jugoslaviji u 20-tom veku: primer Beograda, 
Arhitektura i urbanizam, No. 9, pp. 19-31.  
Blagojević, Lj. (2007) Novi Beograd: osporeni 
modernizam. Beograd: Zavod za udžbenike. 
Brajović, T. (1948) Izgradnja zadružnih domova i 
dužnosti učitelja na kulturno-prosvetnom 
podizanju sela, Narodno zadrugarstvo, No. 4-5, 
pp. 28-29. 
Castillo, G. (1997) Peoples at an Exhibition. 
Soviet Architecture and the National Question, 
in Lahusen, Thomas and Evgeny Dobrenko 
(eds.) Socialist Realism Without Shores. 
Durham and London: Duke University Press, 
pp. 91-119. 
Čolović, I. (1993) Bordel ratnika: folklor, politika i 
rat. Beograd: Biblioteka XX vek. 
Dobrivojević, I., Miletić, A. (2004) Prilog 
izučavanju percepcije sovjetske stvarnosti u 
jugoslovenskim medijima (1945-55), Tokovi 
istorije, No. 1-2, pp. 75-90. 
Table 3. The number of Farming Cooperatives in 
Yugoslavia, 1945-1949.  
 
Year Farming 
cooperatives 
at the end of the 
year 
Farming 
cooperatives found 
1945 31 31 
1946 454 423 
1947 808 354 
1948 1.318 510 
1949 6.625 5.307 
Petranović, B. (1980) Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1978. 
Beograd: Nolit, p. 450, 515. 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
1945 1946 1947 1948 1949
Graph 1. The number of Farming Cooperatives in 
Yugoslavia, 1945-1949. 
Živančević J.: Soviet in Content - People’s in Form: The Building of Farming Cooperative Centres and the Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, 1948-1950 
 
spatium  49 
Dedijer, V. (ed.) (1980) Dokumenti 1948, Vols. 
1, 2.  Beograd: Rad. 
Đokić, V., Nikezić Z. (2007) Political 
circumstances as a risk factor in urban 
development of the city, SPATIUM 
International Review, No. 15/16 , pp. 16-20. 
Epštejn, M. (1998) Postmodernizam. Beograd: 
Zepter. 
Feitö, F. (1971) Histoire des démocraties 
populaires. L`ère de Staline 1945/1952. Paris: 
Seuil.  
Govor druga Edvarda Kardelja na svečanom 
zasedanju slovenske Akademije znanosti i 
umjetnosti (1949), Arhitektura, No. 25-27, 
pp. 3-4.  
Govor potpretsednika Savezne vlade Edvarda 
Kardelja (1948), Politika, April 26, p. 1-6.  
Ilić, D. (1969) Domovi kulture u Socijalističkoj 
Republici Srbiji, Saopštenja IAUS, No. 2, pp. 
20-28. 
Kardelj, E. (1948) Dalji zadaci naše socijalističke 
izgradnje, Narodno zadrugarstvo, No. 4-5, pp. 
7-14. 
Kojić, B. (1973) Seoska arhitektura i rurizam. 
Beograd: Građevinska knjiga. 
Krajgher, M. (1948) Nekoliko misli o liniji naše 
arhitekture, Arhitektura, No. 13-17, pp. 126-9.   
Krunić, J. (ed.) (1948) Zadružni domovi: zbirka 
projekata masovne izgradnje na teritoriji uže 
Srbije, Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine i 
Autonomne Kosovsko Metohijske oblasti u 
1948. godini. Beograd: Zadružna knjiga. 
Krunić, J. (1949) Učešće sekcije arhitekata 
Beograda DIT-a NR Srbije u akciji izgradnje 
zadružnih domova, Tehnika, No. 2-3, pp. 97-9. 
Krunić, J. (1950) Arhitektonsko nasleđe i proces 
stvaranja arhitektonskog izraza, in Referati za I 
savetovanje arhitekata i urbanista Jugoslavije, 
Beograd: Naučna knjiga, pp. 170-5. 
Kuk, K. (1990) Konkursi za Palatu Sovjeta i 
zgradu Nrkomtjažproma u Moskvi, in Perović, 
Miloš (ed.) (2000) Istorija moderne 
arhitekture. Antologija takstova. Kristalizacija 
modernizma. Avangardni pokreti. Knjiga 2B. 
Beograd: Arhitektonski fakultet, pp. 511-20.   
Kulić, V. (2007) Refashioning the CK: Transitory 
Identities of Belgrade’s Tallest Building, in 
Dinulović, Radivoje and Aleksandar Brkić (eds.) 
Theater–Politics–City. Case Study: Belgrade. 
Belgrade: YUSTAT, n.p.  
Lasić, S. (1970) Sukob na književnoj ljevici 1928-
1952. Zagreb: Liber.  
Lujak, M. (2010) Spatialization of Social Process 
vs Singular Object od Architecture, SPATIUM 
International Review, No. 23, pp. 38-45. 
Mac, I.L. (1946) Opštenarodna demokratska 
načela sovjetske arhitekture, Tehnika, No. 4-5, 
pp. 119-23.  
Macura, M. (1948) Zadružni domovi na teritoriji 
NR Srbije, Arhitektura, No. 11-12, pp. 27-31. 
Maksimović, B. (1947-1948) O teorijskom i 
naučnom radu u oblasti sovjetske arhitekture, 
Arhitektura, No. 4-6, pp. 15-16. 
Maksimović, B. (1948) Ka diskusiji o aktuelnim 
problemima naše arhitekture, Arhitektura, No. 
8-10, pp. 73-5. 
Manojlović Pintar, O. (2005) Široka strana moja 
rodnaja. Spomenici sovjetskim vojnicima 
podizani u Srbiji 1944–1954, Tokovi istorije, 
No.1-2, pp. 134-44. 
Merenik, L. (2001) Ideološki modeli: srpsko 
slikarstvo 1945-1968. Beograd: Beopolis. 
Nikolić, M., Ivanišević, M. (1970) Prostorije za 
kulturne aktivnosti na selu. Beograd: 
Savetovanje IPUS. 
Obradović, M. (1995) „Narodna demokratija“ u 
Jugoslaviji 1945-1952. Beograd: INIS. 
Olson, L. (2000) Soviet Approaches to Folk 
Music Performance: Revival or Appropriation? 
University of Colorado. http://www.ucis.pitt. 
edu/nceeer/2000_814-09g_olson-a.pdf (acce-
ssed  August 31,  2007). 
Ostrogović, K. (1947-1948) Arhitektura SSSR 
1917-1947. povodom 30-godišnjice Oktobarske 
revolucije, Arhitektura, No. 4-6, pp. 3-8.  
Pavlović, M. (1997) Srpsko selo 1945-1952, 
Otkup. Beograd: Institut za savremenu istoriju. 
V kongres KPJ i zadružne organizacije (1948), 
Narodno zadrugarstvo, No. 4-5, p. 3. 
Petranović, B. (1980) Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-
1978. Beograd: Nolit. 
Pivac, A. (1951) O domovima kulture, 
Arhitektura, No. 5-8, pp. 108-12. 
Rezolucija sekcije arhitekata na II. Kongresu 
inženjera i tehničara Jugoslavije (1948). 
Arhitektura, No. 13-17, p. 5.  
Stojanović, B. (1947-1948) O socijalističkoj 
arhitekturi (Predavanje arh. B. Stojanovića 
održano u Ruskom domu 22.X 1947. godine), 
Arhitektura, No. 4-6, p. 14. 
Tajge, K. (1977) Realizam, in Vašar umetnosti. 
Beograd: Mala edicija ideja, pp. 257-335. 
Tertz, A. (1965) The Trial Begins. On Socialist 
Realism. New York: Vintage Books.  
U izgradnji zadružnih domova treba se što više 
osloniti na sopstvena sredstva (1948), Borba, 
March 29, p. 1. 
Zakon o Petogodišnjem planu razvitka narodne 
privrede FNRJ u godinama 1947-1951 (1947) 
Borba, May 1. 
Zogović, R. (1948) O jednoj strani borbe za novu, 
socijalističku kulturu i umjetnost, Arhitektura, 
No. 11-12, pp. 54-57. 
Ždanov, A.A. (1934) Govor na Prvom kongresu 
sovjetskih pisaca, in Petrović, Sreten (ed.) 
(1983) Marksizam i književnost I. Beograd: 
Prosveta, pp. 175-82.  
Žižek, S. (1999) The Sublime Object of Ideology, 
London: Verso. 
Živančević, J. (2008) Postmoderni prostor i 
arhitektonska reprezentacija, Forum, No. 53, 
pp. 174-8. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
                                                          
Received October 2010; accepted in revised form     
July 2011 
